Opinion | 5 Places Where the Iran War Could Get Worse

When Mr. Trump returned to the White House last year, a region exhausted by war hoped for negotiations and fresh starts. Instead, the president ended promising nuclear talks with Iran and pushed forward with an ill-defined and economically risky war—a conflict that appears almost designed to destabilize the region.

The United States has not established a clear endpoint for its attack on Iran. The war may or may not topple the current Iranian government (and if so, what would replace it?), and it may or may not lead to U.S. forces securing any remaining nuclear material—a task complicated by Mr. Trump’s bombing campaign last summer, which reportedly buried such material under rubble. The war might be nearing its end or just beginning. The U.S. could send ground troops, or Mr. Trump might decide the conflict is too troublesome and attempt to withdraw, only to find he cannot. Regardless, the United States’ reputation and power are being diminished in real time.

Here is my perspective: this war is likely to become part of a broader regional trend of fragmentation—or at least the threat of it. Israeli and American leaders may recognize they cannot completely dismantle the complex leadership of the Islamic Republic, but their war could fracture Iran ideologically, territorially, or both. This would reduce the threat by making it smaller and more diffuse, creating new opportunities for interference and subversion. They may view the resulting chaos as an acceptable cost for weakening a vast, unified, and opaque Iran.

This approach echoes the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which politically fragmented the country, leaving factions preoccupied with internal rivalries and foreign patrons rather than external neighbors. Israelis saw similar benefits in Syria, where the 2024 fall of the authoritarian al-Assad regime—after half a century of iron-fisted rule—created a power vacuum. The Kurds established an autonomous zone, Israel seized another so-called buffer zone, the southern governorate of Sweida is seeking autonomy, and Turkish and Russian bases remain. Lebanon, long divided by sectarian civil wars, now risks losing its southern region to Israeli occupation. Meanwhile, Turkey watches its Kurdish population for signs of a new armed separatist uprising inspired by the war in Iran. Palestinians are also being divided: Gaza is fragmented into zones, and Palestinians in the West Bank are isolated from one another by ongoing settlement expansion.

Israel and the United States appear to be taking significant risks in this war, aiming to expand their territory or influence and striving for unchallenged regional dominance. They may succeed—or they may not. Meanwhile, nations across the region face the danger of being pulled apart.